A Tunable, Software-based DRAM Error Detection and Correction Library for HPC

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Motivation	Implementation
t Data Corruption (SDC) → undetected soft errors that result in ption in storage (Processor, Cache, Disks, RAM, etc) aults may manifest themselves as bit-flips in memory me bit-flips are not correctable or even detected even with acerbating this situation, when SDC goes undetected, pplications continue to run while reporting invalid results This is a severe problem for today's large-scale simulations er class hardware supports ECC; one common form provides e error correct, double error detect (SECDEC) server class hardware provides no protection y there is no generic way to protect applications without ECC with ECC, hardware SECDEC protection fails you when 3 or bit flips occur	 Page tracking is accomplished with mprotect (removing read/volume) Each new page access triggers an access violation which alloce LIBSDC to monitor application activity (SEGV handler) Swap out unlocked pages upon reach max-unlocked Permission changes break many libraries Syscalls will fail if passed protected pointers <i>ptrace</i> is used to intercept all syscalls and unprotect point within syscall parameters MPI implementations will fail with protected pointers, too LIBSDC's MPI profiling layer wrappers unprotect passed buffers Separate memory allocators prevent unprotected libraries faring virtual addresses in the same page as protected data
events are expected to grow dramatically as chip density, heat	Application Memory with LIBSDC
ration, and core counts increase in larger HPC systems	Unprotected code, BSS, data
LIBSDC: A software-based solution	Protected code, bss, data
Provide SDC protection in software by tracking accesses to ory regions and ensuring their integrity before an application that region's data ach region of memory choose one or both: ashes: Detect memory corruption via hash mismatches CC/Hamming Codes: Correct some SDCs, even if hardware ECC iled to detect them cation-independent and transparent	
ode changes required for applications the MMU provides a granularity of a single page for a region	
MethodSHA1 Hashing (4KB pages)72/64 Hamming Codes (ECC)Storage Overhead0.49%12.5%	LIBSDC internal data, hashes, ECC Image: Locked/Protected Page – LIBSDC must validate before next use – read/w Image: Locked/Unprotected Page – Recently validated – may be read/written Image: LIBSDC storage (i.e., hashes of pages protected)
Tunina	Memory Verification
<i>unlocked:</i> Adjust the maximum number of pages to be allowed ocked" at a time. Ideally set at the number of pages in an cation's working-set during runtime <i>or ECC:</i> Choose if you desire SDC detection and/or correction ory to protect: Choose or combine: oplication's heap, bss, data, and/or code ther linked libraries (optionally include or exclude)	<pre>On page request (inital read or write): If page is locked: Perform hash of page Compare current hash with previously stored known-good hash If any inconsistency found: Notify the presence of SDC and report location Terminate application / Rollback to previous checkpoint Mark page as unlocked (mprotect) On page lock: Calculate new hash of entire page Storage hash in separate location Mark page as locked (mprotect)</pre>

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